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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND KEY MESSAGES  
Risk transfer is widely recognized as a tool for increasing financial resilience to severe 
weather events. But the penetration of risk transfer instruments in developing countries is 
still comparatively low. Negotiators for Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are currently exploring if and how risk transfer mechanisms 
could enhance adaptation efforts in those countries that are most vulnerable and exposed 
to the impacts of extreme weather events that are expected to be affected by climate 
change. One concept that is being investigated is a climate insurance facility. 
 
This paper is intended to inform the UNFCCC’s discussions about ‘Loss and Damage’ by 
providing evidence-based information about existing risk transfer schemes in developing 
countries. We examine 123 natural hazard risk transfer initiatives from the ClimateWise 
Compendium of Disaster Risk Transfer Initiatives in the Developing World, collated by the 
ClimateWise insurance initiative. This new database has been created to bring together the 
existing knowledge about risk transfer schemes in developing countries and offers a snap-
shot of current risk transfer activities in low- and middle-income countries. This paper 
contains a high-level analysis of the database content with a focus on scope and operational 
features, the linkages between risk transfer and risk reduction, and the roles of private and 
public sector players. The key findings can be summarised as follows:  
 
1. Existing risk transfer schemes come in many different forms - they often have 
very different objectives and operational approaches. A range of schemes exist 
that are specific to one particular locality, sector or country. This supports the 
view that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution. 
2. There is very limited evidence of existing schemes taking into account the risk of 
climate change. Only one of the operational schemes listed in The Compendium 
explicitly addresses the impacts of climate change. There are 35 schemes that 
show an explicit link to the concept of disaster risk reduction: 40% of those state 
a direct operational link, for example through incentives and insurance terms, 
                                                                                         
while the other 60% show an indirect link to a broader disaster risk reduction 
program. 
3. The roles played by public, private and third sector players differ from scheme to 
scheme. The private sector provides risk transfer in 89% of schemes, and 
dominates this function across all regions and scheme types. Public funds are 
being used for implementation and operational functions in 68% of all schemes. 
4. For the majority of schemes (14 out of 16) where a direct link between risk 
transfer and risk reduction has been identified, the public sector is involved in 
financing. This suggests that broad partnerships are key to unlocking the 
adaptation potential of risk transfer schemes. 
5. Assessing the effectiveness and sustainability of a risk transfer scheme, 
particularly in the context of climate adaptation, remains a challenge. This goes 
beyond pure economic cost-benefit analysis, and it needs to include the 
recognition of the different stakeholder objectives such as vulnerability 
reduction, commercial viability, affordability, and the financial sustainability of a 
scheme in the context of changing risk levels due to climate change.  The 
Compendium sheds some light on this, but further work is required. 
 
We consider this paper to be a first attempt to analyse information contained in The 
Compendium. Learning from existing risk transfer schemes can be very valuable, and we see 
scope in the future to link The Compendium with the growing case study literature that has 
become available for some risk transfer schemes. This may ultimately aid the development 
of a methodology to assess the effectiveness and sustainability of risk transfer schemes 
under a global adaptation framework.   
 
 
  
                                                                                         
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Developing countries are already heavily exposed to the impact of extreme weather events, 
and often lack the resources and expertise to respond to the risks posed by drought, floods, 
windstorms and other meteorological phenomena. Climate change is expected to change 
the intensity, frequency and distribution of extreme weather events in many parts of the 
world, causing an increase in risks for many low-income countries which has led to an 
intensification of international efforts to respond to this challenge over the last few years.  
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has now 
recognised the importance of assisting vulnerable countries with the management of climate 
risks. The Cancùn Adaptation Framework, an outcome of the 16th session of the Conference 
of Parties to the UNFCCC, highlights the need to strengthen international cooperation and 
expertise to understand and reduce loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of 
climate change
1
. The Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) has initiated a new work 
programme on ‘Loss and Damage’. One particular focus of this work stream is the proposal 
to create a climate insurance facility. This constitutes a recognition that risk transfer is still in 
its infancy in most developing countries, with most low-income countries showing very low 
insurance penetration rates.
2 
 
 
Risk transfer has been used for centuries as a tool to manage the risk of uncertain losses. Its 
most basic and common used form  is insurance, a mechanism whereby an individual or 
organisation (the insured) transfers part of their risk to another party (the insurer) in return 
for a payment (the premium); if the insured experiences a loss or if a certain pre-defined 
event occurs, the insurer pays out a previously agreed amount.
3
  More recently a range of 
new risk transfer instruments have been developed allowing insurers and reinsurers to use 
capital markets as an alternative to traditional types of cover. This securitization of risk 
allows insurance-related risks to be transferred to capital markets through bonds, options or 
other financial instruments. 
 
While risk transfer is no ’magic solution’ for all climate risks faced by developing countries, 
there is evidence that it can play a cost-effective role in a country’s efforts to increase its 
resilience, especially when compared to ex-post disaster aid. If applied correctly, risk 
transfer has the potential to be an important part of a country’s adaptation and economic 
development plan.
4 
 
During the process of shaping the SBI ‘Work Programme on Loss and Damage’, a range of 
open questions emerged about the potential utilisation of risk transfer for climate 
                                                 
1
 Contained in /CP.16 (UNFCCC/AWGLCA/2010/L.7), paragraphs 25-29, 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf 
2
 Closing the financial gap.  New partnerships between the public and private sectors to finance 
disaster risks. Swiss Re 2011 
3
 Ranger, Surminski and Silver - http://unfccc.int/parties_observers/ngo/submissions/items/3689.php  
4
 For example: Linnerooth-Bayer et.al. (2011): Insurance against losses from natural disasters in 
developing countries. evidence, gaps, and the way forward. Journal of Integrated Disaster Risk 
Management 1(I). 
                                                                                         
adaptation. While most of these questions address technical and operational considerations, 
two overarching themes have emerged: the consideration of the roles of public and private 
players and the linkage between risk transfer and risk reduction. 
 
Guided by these open questions, this paper provides evidence-based information about 
existing risk transfer schemes in developing countries, with the aim of informing the current 
discussions on ‘Loss and Damage’ as part of the UNFCCC process, and providing analysis 
about how to build effective and sustainable risk transfer initiatives.  
 
To obtain evidence, we examine 123 risk transfer initiatives presented in the Compendium 
of Disaster Risk Transfer Initiatives in the Developing World that has been collated by the 
ClimateWise insurance initiative. This new database has been created to bring together the 
existing knowledge about risk transfer schemes in developing countries.
5 
The Compendium, 
while not  complete and being  constantly updated and extended, does provide a unique 
overview of the design and operational features of existing schemes, and offers evidence of 
the different roles of private and public players. The database provides a snapshot, drawing 
together relevant analysis.  It captures a key aspect identified under the Work Programme 
on Loss and Damage - the pooling of expertise and the sharing of knowledge about existing 
initiatives and schemes.  
 
The objective is to enhance the knowledge base for donors, insurers, governments and 
broader practitioners operating in disaster risk management and insurance in low and lower-
middle-income economies. While we believe that risk transfer solutions can play an 
important role in increasing a country’s climate resilience and supporting its economic 
growth, we are concerned that, if wrongly designed, they could actually aggregate risks, 
create moral hazard, and lead to a waste of public funds.  
 
The paper is organised as follows: after a brief description of the methodology, our analysis 
is presented in three subsections  
• design and operational issues; 
• the linkage between risk transfer and risk reduction; and 
• the roles of the public and private sectors.  
 
We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for the current discussions about 
the Work Programme on Loss and Damage. 
 
This paper offers the first high-level analysis of The Compendium dataset, but a more 
detailed analysis of some of the schemes, carried out in close collaboration with Parties, 
stakeholders and experts will complement this process and provide further insights. This 
work will continue as more evidence about schemes becomes available. 
 
                                                 
5
 Compendium of Disaster Risk Transfer Initiatives in the Developing World. ClimateWise, 2011 
                                                                                         
II. METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH 
 
This paper provides an empirical assessment of existing disaster risk transfer schemes in 
developing countries, based on analyses of a representative subset of those initiatives as 
recorded by the Compendium of Disaster Risk Transfer Initiatives in the Developing World, 
generated by ClimateWise, an international organisation drawing together members of the 
private insurance industry, and facilitated by the Cambridge Programme for Sustainability 
Leadership (CPSL).  
 
The Compendium documents existing initiatives in middle-income and lower-income 
countries that involve the transfer of financial risk associated with the occurrence of natural 
hazards.
6
 The Compendium captures: 
• schemes that make use of ex-ante risk transfer instruments, including indemnity and 
index-based insurance and insurance-linked securities (e.g. catastrophe bonds, 
catastrophe swaps, and weather hedges); 
• schemes in which the public sector, the private sector or both (as public-private 
partnerships) play a role in their set up and operation; and 
• schemes that have been implemented (fully operational or as pilots) and proposed 
schemes that are at a reasonably advanced conceptual stage.
7
  
The current version of The Compendium corresponds to the first iteration of the 
information-gathering process, and therefore provides an illustrative subset of the total of 
risk transfer initiatives in the countries of interest. A total of 123 schemes have been 
recorded so far.
8
 Table 1 below shows the breakdown of these schemes according to their 
operational status. The present study focuses on operational, pilot and discontinued 
schemes (a total of 101 initiatives) and does not consider proposed schemes.   
 
Operational status Number of schemes 
Operational 76 (61.8%) 
Pilot 17 (13.8%) 
Discontinued 8 (6.5%) 
Proposed 22 (17.9%) 
 
Table 1: Operational status (operational, pilot, discontinued or proposed) of schemes contained in 
The Compendium.  
 
Our analysis in this paper provides the first high-level application of the data to the needs of 
the UNFCCC Work Programme on Loss and Damage. We have been guided by the open 
                                                 
6
 The Compendium mainly includes schemes that cover weather-related hazards, as well as three 
earthquake schemes. 
7
 While The Compendium includes ‘proposed’ schemes that are at an advanced conceptual stage, 
they have not been considered in the analyses presented here.   
8
 Compendium of Disaster Risk Transfer Initiatives in the Developing World. ClimateWise, 2011 
                                                                                         
questions listed under the work stream, which can be broadly divided into three different 
groups: 
 
• scope and operation of risk transfer schemes; 
• links from adaptation and physical risk reduction to risk transfer; and  
• roles of public and private sector. 
Our analysis is purely based on information provided in The Compendium. We recognise 
that this approach comes with a range of limitations, mainly including a possible reporting 
bias. The Compendium is a snapshot and is not complete; new schemes will be emerging, 
others may be closing or refocusing. And, for those schemes that are included, the publicly 
available information might not be comprehensive enough, and detailed data gathering 
would be required.
9
 Recognising these limitations we will conduct a more in-depth analysis 
of a range of schemes listed in The Compendium, involving stakeholder interviews, to gain 
more insight into the roles of public and private players and the potential for linking risk 
transfer and risk reduction, as well as the question of effectiveness.  
III. EVIDENCE FROM THE DATABASE  
 
A  Scope and operation of risk transfer schemes 
 In this section we summarise our findings about the geographical reach and scope of the 
risk transfer schemes included in The Compendium.  
 
Geographical reach 
 
Looking at the number of schemes by geographical reach and by country income level
10
 
(Figure 1), we find that national level schemes dominate in upper-middle-income 
economies, while most schemes in low-income economies operate at the local level. Lower-
middle-income economies show a more balanced mix.  
                                                 
9
 According to ClimateWise, The Compendium is considered to be a ‘live document’, which includes 
information that is as complete as possible about existing schemes in the considered countries. The 
present version of The Compendium corresponds to the first iteration of the information-gathering 
process, and therefore provides an illustrative subset of the total of risk transfer initiatives in the 
countries of interest. 
 
10
 The classification of income groups in the database is based on the World Bank’s income group 
classification of economies (January 2011), based on 2009 gross national income (GNI) per capita, and 
calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. 
                                                                                         
 
 
Figure 1: Number of schemes by geographical reach/ scale and by country income level. Legend 
indicates the different geographic levels considered. 
 
Our analysis of the different types of risk transfer schemes
11
 and their geographical reach 
(Figure 2) shows a significant dominance of agricultural schemes in all regions (68 of 93 
                                                 
11
 Classification of schemes (based on World Bank definitions): 
• Sovereign disaster risk transfer: strategies that aim to increase the financial response capacity of 
governments in the aftermath of natural disasters, while protecting their long-term fiscal 
balances, through the use of risk transfer instruments including insurance and insurance-linked 
securities (e.g. catastrophe bonds, catastrophe swaps, and weather hedges). 
• Property catastrophe risk insurance: these schemes aim at developing catastrophe insurance 
markets and increasing property catastrophe insurance penetration among homeowners, small 
and medium enterprises, and public entities.  
• Agricultural insurance: these schemes aim at developing programs for farmers, herders and 
agricultural financing institutions (e.g. rural banks, microfinance institutions) to increase their 
financial resilience to adverse natural hazards. These schemes have been sub-classified as “index-
based” or “indemnity-based”, according to the type of insurance instrument used. Agricultural 
insurance schemes covering low income farmers have been classified as “agricultural insurance”, 
rather than under “disaster micro-insurance”. 
• Disaster micro-insurance: schemes that facilitate access to disaster insurance products to protect 
the livelihoods of the poor against extreme events.  
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operational schemes i.e. 73%). This is not surprising, as agriculture is the largest sector in 
most developing countries and is also highly exposed to natural hazards.  
 
For the East Asia & Pacific and South Asia regions, we note a high proportion of index-based 
insurance and micro-insurance schemes. It is important to note that in some countries 
index-based risk transfer is not permitted by the insurance regulator. Across all regions 
property catastrophe risk transfers are the least common. The Latin America and the 
Caribbean region shows the highest concentration of schemes.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of schemes by scheme type and by world region. Legend indicates the broad 
scheme types/ categories considered. 
 
There is a wide range of scheme volumes. For 66 schemes we found information on the 
number of insureds. Figure 3 summarizes scheme volume in terms of insured numbers, for 
the most recent years available.
12
 The majority of schemes are relatively small – which can 
present a challenge for the effectiveness and sustainability of the risk transfer.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Source: Innovation in Disaster Risk Financing for Developing Countries: Public and Private 
Contributions. The World Bank, March 2011. Produced by a team lead by Olivier Mahul and 
comprising Laura Boudreau, Morton Lane (Lane Financial LLC), Roger Beckwith (Lane Financial LLC), 
and Emily White. 
 
12
 70% of recorded information corresponds to years within the period 2007-2010; the rest to earlier 
years. 
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Figure 3: Number of schemes according to scheme volume ranges (insured numbers). 
 
If we look at the type of scheme in the context of country income level (Figure 4), the 
following picture emerges. Agricultural insurance is the most common type in all income 
categories.  Traditional indemnity-based schemes are the dominant type in upper-middle-
income countries, and newer index-based schemes have a larger share in low- and lower-
middle-income countries. This could be related to the fact that schemes in those two income 
groups have only emerged recently and are often specifically designed to test the use of 
index-based risk transfer. Disaster micro-insurance is common in low-income and lower-
middle-income countries, but property catastrophe insurance schemes are almost absent 
from these countries.   
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Figure 4: Number of schemes by scheme type and by country income group. Legend indicates the 
broad scheme types/ categories considered. 
 
Risk transfer trigger mechanisms  
 
Risk transfer can indemnify for a loss (indemnity) or allow a payment upon the occurrence of 
a trigger event based on a pre-agreed parameter or index. Our analysis (Figure 5) shows 
that, as expected, the majority of risk transfer schemes are based on the concept of 
indemnity. Index-based mechanisms are common in agriculture, and dominate the sovereign 
risk transfers.  
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Figure 5: Number of schemes by scheme type and by risk transfer trigger mechanism (shown in the 
legend). 
 
Types of risks covered 
 
The Compendium contains schemes for risk transfer for natural hazards, including those that 
only cover a single type of hazard (19 schemes) and multiple hazards (74 schemes). We note 
that 58% of all schemes do cover weather- and non-weather-related hazards, such as 
earthquakes. Because of their potential relevance for questions about design, operation, 
public/private involvement and risk reduction, The Compendium also includes three 
operational schemes that do only provide cover against non-weather risks: the Residential 
Earthquake Insurance Pool of Taiwan (TREIF)
13
, the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool 
(TCIP), and the Indonesian Catastrophe Reinsurance Pool (MAIPARK).  
 
A mixed picture emerges when assessing the level of risks covered: 27 schemes define 
themselves as offering cover for catastrophe events, 20 schemes appear to cover both 
catastrophe and more frequent events, and 45 schemes focus on more frequent events only.  
 
Scope of the schemes  
 
In the database we find evidence of a range of different scopes of coverage: 75 out of 93 
operational schemes provide cover for individuals, such as farmers and property-owners, 
while 8 offer risk transfer for sovereigns (national or multi-national government bodies). In 
                                                 
13
 Refer to section VII (List of schemes referenced in the analysis) for the complete list of examples of 
schemes referred to in the text.  
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between these two groups are schemes aimed the ‘meso-level’, defined in The Compendium 
as insurance of risk aggregators such as banks, insurers, and cooperatives. Examples are the 
flood index crop insurance scheme in Vietnam and the Indonesian Catastrophe Reinsurance 
Pool (MAIPARK) - 15 out of the 93 operational schemes fall into this category. This figure 
includes some double-counting, as there are five schemes that effectively cover two levels 
i.e. meso-level and individuals (4 schemes), and sovereign and meso-level (1 scheme). 
 
 
B Linking adaptation and physical risk reduction with the risk transfer 
 
Fundamentally, risk transfer removes or reduces the risk of experiencing an uncertain 
financial loss. But it is widely recognised that risk transfer, if designed and operated 
appropriately, can play a role in physical risk reduction and adaptation. This potential is 
particularly relevant to the UNFCCC‘s Work Programme on Loss and Damage, because public 
funds for adaptation may be used to finance or subsidize risk transfer schemes. There is a 
semantic challenge one must consider when analyzing the link between risk transfer and risk 
reduction and adaptation:  stakeholders do not always speak the same language and may 
use terms such as loss prevention, risk engineering, risk reduction, vulnerability reduction 
and climate adaptation, all in the same context. Without going into greater detail about the 
different concepts and definitions used, it is important to highlight that relevant activities 
may not be considered under the headings of risk reduction or adaptation.  
 
The Compendium includes only one explicit climate change reference within an operational 
risk transfer scheme - The Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) (Box 1).
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One scheme – Fondo de Mitigacion del Riesgo Agrario in Bolivia - explicitly addresses 
adaptation to environmental factors, including weather risks, but does not specifically refer 
to the impacts of climate change. 
                                                 
14
 HARITA quarterly report: January 2011–March 2011 by Oxfam America. Rural Resilience Series. 
HARITA quarterly report: October 2010–December 2010 by Oxfam America. Rural Resilience Series. 
Box 1:  the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA)  
The HARITA program is an agricultural insurance scheme that provides 
cover against drought for Ethiopian farmers growing teff, wheat and 
barley.  HARITA intends to facilitate adaptation to climate change by 
integrating index insurance with other risk reduction activities such as 
small-scale water harvesting, improved agronomic practices, 
conservation measures, and seasonal and daily weather forecasting. 
Following the example set by the Productive Safety Net Program 
(Ethiopia’s social protection scheme), HARITA allows poor farmers to 
pay for premiums with their labor. The scheme promotes the link 
between insurance and adaptation by enabling farmers to pay 
insurance premiums through their contribution to develop community 
assets such as water harvesting structures and other long-term risk 
reduction measures. 
                                                                                         
 
Despite the lack of references to climate change, we can still find evidence of linkages 
between risk transfer and risk reduction. The most basic form is the creation of at least some 
form of risk awareness, which is common to all ex-ante risk management measures and not 
just risk transfer. Examples from The Compendium that specifically mention activities to 
improve understanding and awareness of risks include the national index-based disaster 
insurance program (weather derivative) for Malawi, where Malawi Meteorological Services’ 
national maize yield assessment models are used to calculate the value of projected losses if 
precipitation falls below a certain level. Another example is the Weather Based Crop 
Insurance Scheme (WBCIS) in India, which attempts to improve risk assessments by applying 
new simulation models and by supporting the expansion of weather network stations.  
 But beyond this basic level of linkage to risk reduction there appears to be a wider potential   
for risk transfer to become an integral part of risk reduction efforts.   
 
 
 
Figure 6: Proportion of schemes contained in The Compendium where risk transfer has some type of 
association (direct or indirect) to risk reduction measures; or has no association to risk reduction (as 
shown by the legend). 
 
Analyzing the evidence in The Compendium (Figure 6), two main categories can be 
identified:  
 
Indirect linkage - where risk transfer is considered as one element within the overall policy 
framework for disaster risk reduction or adaptation. The Compendium provides 21 examples 
where risk transfer and risk reduction are not operationally linked, but where both feature 
13.9 %
20.8 %
65.3 %
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as elements of an overall disaster risk reduction strategy or an adaptation plan. An example 
for this is the national index-based disaster insurance program (weather derivative) for 
Malawi, which is part of the national agricultural risk management framework for food 
security (Agricultural Development Programme, ADP). The weather derivative product 
transfers the financial risk of severe national drought that adversely impacts national maize 
production.  It complements other tools within the ADP to manage maize production risk 
such as agricultural technology, investments in irrigation, and the development of grain 
markets. Another example is PepsiCo's index weather insurance scheme for potato contract 
farmers in India. The risk transfer is part of PepsiCo’s 360-degree farmer connect program, 
which intends to reduce the risk of crop loss and to ensure the supply of quality crop to the 
company. Risk reduction measures implemented under the program, besides the facilitation 
of crop/weather risk insurance, include the supply of high-quality agricultural inputs to 
farmers, the provision of technical know-how, and the provision of access to soft loans and 
to other financial incentives for farmers following the program’s recommended practices.  
 
Direct linkage – where a risk transfer scheme explicitly supports risk reduction efforts as part 
of its operation. The Compendium contains 14 examples, which are analyzed here.  
 
 
Risk reduction scales for schemes with a direct risk reduction linkage 
Analysing the evidence from The Compendium, a picture of different ‘adaptation and risk 
reduction scales’ emerges (Figure 7): 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Number of schemes according to different types/ degrees of direct linkage between risk 
transfer and risk reduction.  
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The Compendium records evidence of specific risk awareness-raising initiatives driven by 
the parties involved in the risk transfer, for three schemes (see Figure 7). One example is the 
Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program in Ethiopia, where seasonal 
and daily weather forecasts are provided. We suspect that there are more schemes engaged 
in these activities than are recorded in The Compendium, and so this relatively low number 
is the result of information bias as not all schemes may publicly disclose these types of 
activity.  
 
For 6 schemes there is evidence of capacity-building through knowledge transfer and 
educational elements (see Figure 7). One example is Fondo de Mitigacion del Riesgo Agrario 
(FMRA) in Bolivia, where “reference farmers also serve as technical assistance agents to 
promote ideas for increasing yields and reducing disaster risks and impacts.”
15
  Another 
example is the Hurricane-Resistant Home Improvement Program (HRHIP), a discontinued 
scheme in St. Lucia, through which “minimum building standards were developed for 
reference by homeowners, and builders and local builders were trained in safer 
construction”. The Flood Index (ENSO) insurance in Peru also records educational efforts to 
help farmers with risk reduction efforts, such as clearing drainage systems.   
 
We found 12 schemes with explicit incentive structures for risk reduction in place (see 
Figure 7). One example is the National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (NAIS) and the 
modified NAIS (mNAIS) project in India, where “the mNAIS scheme aims at encouraging the 
farmers to adopt progressive farming practices, high value in-puts and better technology in 
agriculture. In particular a premium structure is worked out with a discount provision on the 
premium in respect of a unit area where all farmers have adopted better water conservation 
and sustainable farming practices for better risk mitigation.”
16 
 The most common incentive 
tool is risk-based pricing, where the premium is set to reflect risk levels. This differentiation 
between risk categories can send a signal about risk reduction and adaptation.
 
An example 
from The Compendium is the state-subsidised index weather crop insurance in India, where 
the premium to be paid by the farmer depends upon factors such as the type of crop 
cultivated and the geographical location of the farm.  Another example is the agricultural 
insurance scheme in Costa Rica, in which the “original gross rates vary from 3% to 8%, 
depending on the crop and location. For forestry plantations original gross rates vary from 
2.0% to 3.5% of TSI depending on the region, type of plantation, protection measures, 
contingency plans implemented by the insured, deductibles, and indemnity limits.”
17
The 
Compendium provides evidence of risk-based pricing for a total of 9 schemes – but we 
would expect this number to be higher and suspect some reporting bias, as not all risk 
transfer schemes may have publicly referenced their pricing approach.   
 
Elements of compulsory risk reduction are recorded for four schemes (see Figure 7). Here 
the risk reduction link is driven by the terms and conditions of the risk transfer scheme, with 
                                                 
15
 Compendium of Disaster Risk Transfer Initiatives in the Developing World. ClimateWise, 2011 
16
 Compendium of Disaster Risk Transfer Initiatives in the Developing World. ClimateWise, 2011 
17
 Compendium of Disaster Risk Transfer Initiatives in the Developing World. ClimateWise, 2011 
                                                                                         
compliance being a prerequisite for participation in the risk transfer. An example is the Crop-
Credit Insurance Guarantee Program for Small and Marginal Farmers (SEAF) in Brazil, in 
which the farmer must commit to applying risk reduction methods and technology in order 
for the risk transfer to be valid. A similar approach is taken by the agricultural insurance 
scheme in Sudan, where farmers are also required to adopt more resilient farming practices 
to gain access to the risk transfer scheme.   
 
Scheme type Number of schemes 
Agricultural insurance (indemnity- based) 6 
Agricultural insurance (index- based) 5 
Disaster micro-insurance 1 
Property catastrophe risk insurance 2 
Sovereign disaster risk transfer 0 
 
Table 2: Schemes with a direct link between risk transfer as risk reduction, classified according to 
scheme type.  
 
Table 2 above shows the number of schemes of each type that possess a direct link to risk 
reduction as part of their operation. Agricultural schemes are the largest group (76% of 
identified schemes). The other schemes that directly support risk reduction are disaster 
micro-insurance and property catastrophe insurance.  
 
Measuring the effectiveness of any of the risk reduction measures described above is a 
challenge. Quantifying and verifying any increased climate resilience does require extensive 
data collection on the ground and sophisticated modeling. Monitoring the compliance with 
and implementation of risk reduction activities is necessary, but this can be very costly. New 
technologies such as remote sensing may help overcome some of the practical challenges.  
Given the variety of schemes and the range of risk reduction support measures, a case by 
case analysis appears to be the only valid approach to quantifying a scheme’s actual 
contribution to adaptation and disaster risk reduction.  
 
 
C The roles of public, private and third sectors 
 
One aspect frequently discussed in the context of the Work Programme on Loss and Damage 
is the balance between public and private involvement in risk transfer initiatives. Our 
analysis finds that a large majority (82%) of schemes include some form of public and private 
involvement.  No reference is made to any public role for 19, while 3 schemes appear not to 
involve the private sector. We treat this finding with caution and expect that the number of 
recorded initiatives with no involvement from the public sector is not a true representation , 
compared with the number of recorded public or public-private initiatives, as it is often 
difficult to obtain data about purely private schemes.   
                                                                                         
The Compendium differentiates between the risk transfer role and other roles, such as 
operational support functions. For the provision of the actual risk transfer the following 
picture emerges:  
The private sector is providing the actual risk transfer in 89% of schemes, with varying risk 
levels and volumes of insurance and reinsurance layers included in the different schemes. In 
the majority of cases where the public sector is involved in risk transfer, it does so in 
partnership with the private sector. For property catastrophe insurance schemes, 
partnerships between the public and private sectors are more frequent than the provision of 
risk transfer by the private sector on its own. The role of the third sector in the provision of 
risk transfer is comparatively small. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Number of schemes by scheme type and by sector providing risk transfer (indicated in the 
legend). 
Notes for Figure 8: 
• Private provision of risk transfer: 
 Domestic: includes the provision of primary cover by domestic 
private insurers, mutual insurance companies and Micro Financing 
Institutions, and the provision of reinsurance by domestic private 
reinsurers. 
 International: includes an insurance company from a foreign country 
providing insurance in the considered country, the provision of 
reinsurance by international reinsurers, and initiatives where risk is 
transferred to the capital markets. 
• Public provision of risk transfer: includes the provision of insurance by a 
public insurer and the provision of reinsurance by a public reinsurer or by 
the Government. 
• Public-private provision of risk transfer: refers to cases where both the 
public and the private sector are involved in risk transfer, as follows: 
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 Public sector provides insurance but there is a secondary level of risk 
transfer to private reinsurers, to protect the program. 
 Insurance is provided by the private sector, but the Government 
acts as the reinsurer of last resort (for losses beyond the highest 
layer of the insurance program), or the Government reinsures a 
specific risk layer of the program. 
• Third sector: the risk transfer function is provided by NGOs. 
 
When assessed against country income groups, the following picture emerges in terms of 
the provision of risk transfer: in low-income countries, the majority of schemes have largely 
private provision of risk transfer, with relatively small numbers of public–private 
partnerships and pure public schemes. In lower-middle-income countries, a picture similar 
to that in low-income countries emerges, but the public sector plays a relatively bigger role 
in the risk transfer provision, particularly in partnership with the private sector. In upper-
middle-income countries, the risk transfer function is almost equally divided between 
private and public-private partnerships. 
 
  
 
Figure 9: Number of schemes by country income group and by sector providing risk transfer 
(indicated in the legend).  
Notes for Figure 9: The figures contain ‘double counting’ for two multi-national schemes 
that are implemented across countries belonging to different income levels. 
 
The Compendium also provides information about the ‘recipients’ (the insured) in the risk 
transfer schemes. In considering this in relation to the risk transfer providers the following 
picture emerges (Figure 10).  
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Figure 10: Number of schemes by insured parties and by sector providing risk transfer (indicated in 
the legend). 
Notes for Figure 10: 
• Individuals: farmers, herders, homeowners etc. 
• Meso-level: banks, rural financial institutions, insurance companies, 
cooperatives, NGOs, MFIs, etc. 
• Sovereign: national and regional governments. 
 
The large majority (80%) of schemes provide cover for individuals, of which 54% are covered 
by the private sector, and 35% by public-private schemes. 
 
The clearest concentration of private sector risk transfer provision can be found for those 
schemes at the ‘meso-level’ (71 %). All of the schemes where the public sector provides the 
risk transfer are aimed at individuals. 
 
While the provision of risk transfer is the core element of any scheme, a range of wider 
operational and support functions exist, which all require some form of funding. The 
Compendium provides references to the following functions, but gives no indication about 
the size of the investments required:  
- Funding of technical assistance projects. 
- Financing of scheme feasibility studies. 
- Financing the development of tools such as risk and actuarial models. 
- Financing the development of new insurance products, and the design and 
structuring of insurance facilities. 
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- Funding the provision of education and capacity building. 
- Financing the development of infrastructure such as weather station networks. 
- Provision of start-up capital, provision of capital support. 
- Financing program start-up costs. 
- Financing operational costs (e.g. insurer’s administrative and operating 
expenses, loss adjustment expenses, etc.). 
- Subsidizing insurance premiums. 
- Provision of funding for reinsurance purchase. 
 
In 68% of the schemes, we found evidence of public funding for support and operational 
functions. One example of a scheme that does not appear to use any form of public funding 
is the typhoon index crop insurance in the Philippines. 
 
The role of the international public sector 
 
The Compendium provides evidence of the roles played by the international public sector: 
36% of the schemes involve international governmental donors in a variety of roles, such as: 
• initiating schemes – illustrated by the index weather crop insurance in Ethiopia: the 
Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) program [Initiator: World Food 
Programme (WFP)]. 
• premium payment - for example, the national index-based disaster insurance 
programme (weather derivative) for Ethiopia, where, in the first phase of the 
project, the premium was paid by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID). 
• technical assistance provider – an example is the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk 
Insurance Facility (CCRIF), where the World Bank Treasury assisted CCRIF in 
completing a risk swap transaction with the financial markets; another example is 
the agricultural insurance scheme in Ukraine, where international donor agencies 
were involved in the drafting of insurance laws. 
The role of the Third Sector 
 
For 8 schemes there is evidence of NGOs being involved in the operation. An example is the 
Disaster Preparedness Program in India (Andhra Pradesh), where Oxfam sponsored 50% of 
the premiums in the first year, provided technical support, and trained ‘village disaster 
management volunteers’ for distributing the risk transfer, so that operational costs could be 
reduced. We have found two examples where there is evidence of NGOs providing risk 
transfer: The Fondo de Mitigacion del Riesgo Agrario (FMRA) in Bolivia and the Centre for 
Self-Help Development (CSD) disaster microinsurance program in Nepal. Other roles 
associated with NGOs include the provision of start-up capital (4 schemes), initiation and 
development (1 scheme), management of the scheme, and the provision of technical 
assistance and information (4 schemes). 
 
An interesting picture emerges when analysing the roles of different stakeholders in the 
context of risk reduction linkages. For those schemes where a direct link between risk 
                                                                                         
transfer and risk reduction is recorded, we notice that the public sector plays a larger role 
than in those schemes without risk reduction linkage: in 10 of the cases the public is 
involved in the provision of risk transfer (55 %), which compares to the 40 % based on the 
whole Compendium. The public sector provides financing beyond its risk transfer role for 14 
of the schemes (78% of the total, which compares to 61% based on the whole 
Compendium).  
 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Our analysis has provided some insights into the structure, design and operation of existing 
risk transfer schemes. There appears to be potential in many places and a growing 
recognition of the possible roles for risk transfer, with the existing schemes providing useful 
examples of different approaches and strategies. We conclude that there is no ‘one-size-fits-
all’ solution; the design and operation of risk transfer schemes are often closely linked to 
local specifications. Closer examination shows that the schemes are hugely diverse, often 
created to meet very specific needs in a particular community, with a wide range of 
stakeholders being involved, and differing levels of risk transfer being provided. 
 
While agricultural insurance is the most common form in all countries, we note particular 
geographical preferences for other types of insurance – such as micro-insurance in Asia. This 
may reflect local tradition and possibly also cultural differences, while other factors, such as 
links to micro-finance schemes, may influence this. The dominance of local-level schemes in 
low-income countries highlights a current gap in coverage at the sovereign-level for those 
countries. It is also important to note that the existing local schemes are not broadly spread 
and replicated across a country, but often take the form of local pilot projects. A key issue to 
explore is how to bring these schemes to scale and how to overcome the challenges faced by 
existing schemes. 
 
Out of 123 in the Disaster Risk Transfer Compendium, 51 provide evidence of challenges to 
scheme development and sustainability, which have been explored by ClimateWise on a 
preliminary basis. Commonly referenced challenges are low penetration rates, lack of risk 
information, the affordability of insurance, the availability of local insurance delivery 
channels, lack of financial capacity, small scheme sizes and reliance on donor funds. 
The Compendium also provides some insights on 8 schemes that have been discontinued, of 
which 5 mention lack of demand and 2 refer to supply-side issues. But the information 
provided is, to a large extent, subjective – exploring the failings and unlocking the lessons 
learned is a very sensitive issue and further in-depth investigations would be required. 
 
In the context of the discussion about the Work Programme on Loss and Damage, this leads 
to the challenge of agreeing how a global facility or governance structure could assist with 
local delivery - a common dilemma faced by adaptation policy-makers. Here the key 
consideration is if and how risk transfer schemes fit into the overall adaptation framework, 
                                                                                         
and if there is a need for new mechanisms to foster the application of risk transfer in 
vulnerable countries. 
 
Our analysis shows that the full potential for utilizing risk transfer for adaptation is far from 
exhausted – in fact only very few schemes show a direct operational link between risk 
transfer and risk reduction, and only one appears to have explicitly taken into account the 
impact of climate change on risk levels. Not surprisingly, the large majority of risk transfer 
schemes focus on today’s weather risks. This can capture a lot of experience and knowledge 
suitable for adaptation efforts, as resilience to today’s weather is a step towards adaptation 
to a changing climate. But risk transfer schemes that do not recognize future risks may even 
lead to mal-adaptation. This seems to be a well-recognized shortcoming, as most of the 
proposed schemes featured in the database (which have not been part of our analysis) show 
signs of capturing the challenges of climate change. 
 
Our analysis shows a clear dominance of the private sector in the provision of risk transfer, 
either alone or through public-private partnerships. This suggests that more emphasis needs 
to be placed on the issue of commercial viability when considering the extension of the 
scope and reach of risk transfer schemes. This becomes particularly relevant at a time of 
constrained public finances, where private sector engagement is a growing paradigm. But 
we note that within the ‘Loss and Damage discussions’, no clear consensus about the extent 
of private sector engagement has emerged; with concerns about the lack of commercial 
viability and the crowding out by public schemes on the one hand, and worries about profit-
making elements and a potential short-term view of private sector players surfacing on the 
other. Common reservations about the utilization of private risk transfers for adaptation 
policy are being aired – such as a level of mistrust towards the private sector and ethical 
concerns about the use of public adaptation money to create new markets for private 
insurers. Interestingly we have found that the public appears to play a disproportionally 
large role in those few cases that explicitly link risk transfer and risk reduction. We are 
already conducting further work, engaging with stakeholders to shed more light on the 
public and private roles. 
 
Ultimately all this points to the question of effectiveness – what makes a risk transfer 
scheme effective and sustainable? This is a normative question, and the database does not 
provide an answer, but does offer several pointers. 
 
Assessing the effectiveness of any risk transfer scheme is a challenge, but this becomes even 
more difficult in the context of climate change adaptation. At first glance, the 123 examples 
captured by the database give the impression that it may just be a question of supply and 
demand to bring these efforts to scale and to roll them out across a larger number of 
countries. 
 
But to what extent do these schemes support adaptation in vulnerable countries? While we 
found evidence of varying levels of risk reduction support, it is almost impossible to assess 
the effectiveness of these efforts. Measurement of the risk reduction achieved through the 
risk transfer schemes creates several challenges: success or failure often only become 
                                                                                         
evident after another risk event, and it requires in-depth data collection on the ground. 
Efforts have been made to explore this for particular cases – such as exploring actual risk 
reduction activities through surveys and on-the-ground verification activities. But a general 
high-level assessment of what works and where the most effective linkages are is still 
missing at this stage.  
 
Our analysis of the Compendium has provided some valuable insights, but it also has clear 
limitations. Some of the key questions being asked in the context of the discussion about the 
Work Programme on Loss and Damage do require a continuing effort to further collate the 
level of analysis and knowledge that already exists for specific schemes in the form of case 
studies and analytical assessments. We see the Disaster Risk Transfer Compendium as a 
useful first step and suggest that this could be developed into a continuously-updated 
source of evidence about risk transfer schemes. 
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VII. LIST OF SCHEMES REFERENCED IN THE ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
Compendium ID Risk transfer scheme 
8 Flood index crop insurance in Vietnam 
15 Fondo de Mitigacion del Riesgo Agrario (FMRA) in Bolivia 
26 State-subsidized index weather crop insurance in India 
27 PepsiCo's index weather insurance for potato contract farmers in India 
30 
National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (NAIS) and the modified NAIS 
(mNAIS) project in India 
32 Weather Based Crop Insurance Scheme (WBCIS)  in India  
35 
Index weather crop insurance in Ethiopia: Horn of Africa Risk Transfer 
for Adaptation (HARITA)            
57 
Crop-Credit Insurance Guarantee Program for Small and Marginal 
Farmers (SEAF) in Brazil 
64 Agricultural insurance in Costa Rica 
83 Agricultural insurance in  Sudan 
85 Agricultural insurance in Ukraine 
88 Hurricane-Resistant Home Improvement Program (HRHIP) in St. Lucia  
95 
Centre for Self-Help Development (CSD) disaster microinsurance 
program in Nepal 
98 Disaster Preparedness Program in India (Andhra Pradesh) 
101 Residential Earthquake Insurance Pool of Taiwan (TREIF) 
102  Turkish   Catastrophe   Insurance Pool  (TCIP) 
107 Indonesian  Catastrophe Reinsurance Pool (MAIPARK ) 
114 
National index-based disaster insurance program (weather derivative) 
for Malawi 
115 
National index-based disaster insurance program (weather derivative) 
for Ethiopia  
116 Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) 
123 Flood Index (ENSO)  insurance in Peru 
